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
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TAGS: PGOV, PE

SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER WAGNER'S COMMENTS ON THE
CARABALLEDA DOCUMENT AT THE JANUARY 16 LUNCHEON FOR
SENATOR KENNEDY

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DURING THE JANUARY 16 LUNCHEON FOR SENATOR KENNEDY, WHICH I ATTENDED, FOREIGN MINISTER ALLAN WAGNER PRAISED THE CARABALLEDA DOCUMENT FOR ITS BALANCE AND FOR ITS UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FROM THE CONTADORA GROUP, WARNED AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCUMENT NOT BEING IMPLEMENTED AND RESPONDED TO SKEPTICAL QUESTIONS WITHOUT SHOWING ANY SIGNS OF DOUBT ABOUT ITS REALISM AND POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS. END SUMMARY

3. DURING THE JANUARY 16 LUNCHEON FOR SENATOR KENNEDY, HELD AT TORRE TAGLE PALACE, FOREIGN MINISTER ALLAN WAGNER ENTHUSIASTICALLY ENDORSED THE CARABALLEDA DOCUMENT. WAGNER FELT THE DOCUMENT WAS EXTREMELY VALUABLE. IT WAS BALANCED. BOTH THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA WERE CALLED ON TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS. AND IT WAS A CONSENSUS. ALL THE CONTADORA GROUP AND THE SUPPORT GROUP AGREED ON ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE SINGLED OUT AS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THE REQUEST THAT THE U.S. NO LONGER FUND THE CONTRAS, THAT BILATERAL OR THE MANZANILLO TALKS BE RESUMED, AND THAT NICARAGUA BE GIVEN A RESPIRE SO THAT ITS DOMESTIC REPRESSION COULD BE EASED.

4. THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT IMPLEMENTING THE DOCUMENT'S PROPOSALS WERE WAR AND THE DESTABILIZATION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES, THE MINISTER ARGUED. THERE WAS A STEADILY INCREASING MOMENTUM TOWARD WAR. IF THE U.S. WOULD FOLLOW THE DOCUMENT'S KEY PROPOSAL, THIS MOMENTUM COULD BE CHECKED AND THE MORE MODERATE ELEMENTS AMONG THE SANDINISTAS COULD COME TO THE FORE. WAGNER IDENTIFIED TOMAS BORGE AN AN EXTREMIST (HE WANTS TO CREATE A MARXIST-LENINIST STATE), AND DANIEL ORTEGA AS A MODERATE (HE IS MORE FLEXIBLE AND REALISTIC). (#)
WARN WHICH HE IMPLIED MEANT AN AMERICAN INVASION OF NICARAGUA, WOULD POLARIZE OPINION IN THE LATIN AMERICAN STATES AND VERY POSSIBLY DESTABILIZE THE STILL FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES OF THE REGION.

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5. SENATOR KENNEDY ASKED IF ANY OF THE MINISTERS WHO HAD GONE TO VINICIO CEREZO'S INAUGURATION IN GUATEMALA HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF CUTTING U.S. AID TO THE CONTRAS WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH. WAGNER SAID THAT THE ISSUE WAS RAISED AND V.P. BUSH'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN NEGATIVE. THE SENATOR ALSO ASKED IF PERU WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPLY ANY TROOPS FOR A FORCE TO SUPERVISE A CEASEFIRE. WAGNER RESPONDED THAT PERU WOULD IF THEY WERE FOR A GENUINE PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

6. I ASKED THE MINISTER WHAT STEPS HE EXPECTED NICARAGUA TO TAKE IN CONJUNCTION WITH A CESSATION OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENTS. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT EXPECT NICARAGUA TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO THE U.S. ENDING OF SUPPORT FOR THE CONTRAS, HE DID EXPECT THE SANDINISTAS TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS WITH REASONABLE TIME UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE EIGHT CARABALLEDA SUPPORTERS. FROM HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH CUBAN LEADERS TOO, HE BELIEVED CUBA WOULD PUSH NICARAGUA TO ACCOMMODATE ITSELF TO THE CARBALLEDA DOCUMENT.

7. WAGNER SEEMED GENUINELY CONCERNED THAT NICAR WAS BEING FORCED INTO AN INCREASINGLY TOTALITARIAN POSTURE AND THAT INVASION WAS EVERMORE LIKELY. HE HAD EXPECTED SENATOR KENNEDY TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO HIS ARGUMENTS. HE DID NOT APPEAR TO THINK HIS APPEARANCE BE SEEN AS BUYING TIME FOR NICARAGUA. NOR DID HE PERCEIVE HIS INTERLOCUTOR'S QUESTIONS AS REFLECTING SKEPTICISM REGARDING THE CARABALLEDA DOCUMENT.

JORDAN
END OF MESSAGE

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